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Comment
DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS ON THE
EMPLOYMENT POWER AND THE
TEACHING PROFESSION
A teacher should be appointed solely on the basis of teaching
ability and competence in his professional field without regard to
such factors as sex, race, nationality, creed, religious or political
belief or affiliation, or behavior not demonstrably related to the
teaching function. Continuation of appointment and the granting of
tenure after a reasonable probationary period should depend upon
performance as a teacher and scholar.'
Such is the statement of position of the American Civil Liberties
Union in regard to the issues properly considered in the decision
to hire or fire a teacher. Whether these standards are met is ques-
tionable. This comment is concerned with a particular aspect of
the problem. The basic proposition is that a teacher has a right
to be free from arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the
state when it exercises its power over employment.
First it is necessary to indicate what is to be excluded from dis-
cussion. Section 1983 of the United States Code2 under which these
issues would normally arise provides some limits. The action which
is to be reviewed must be "under color of law," and there must be
a denial of "life, liberty, or property" to bring the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses into play. The bounds of the phrase "color
of law" will not be considered here. In addition, certain distinctions
will not be made or discussed. For example, whether non-retention,
as opposed to dismissal, can be made a ground for an action under
section 1983 will not be considered.3 Nor will there be any extended
1 AmIIERIcA_ CIVIL LiBERms UNION, AcADEnc FREEDoM IN THE SECONDARY
SCHOOLS 5 (1968).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."
3 At present there is some debate as to the validity of such a distinc-
tion. Cf. Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970); Frakt,
Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KiAN. L. Rsv. 27, 35(1969); Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 836 (1969); Note, 16 WAYNE L. REV.
252 (1969). Compare Cook County Teachers Union, Local 1600 v.
Byrd, -F.Supp.- (N.D.1L 1970) with Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1970).
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consideration of the distinction between tenured and non-tenured
faculty, since the problems considered below appear in either
situation.4
Judicial thinking has developed to the position that if a teacher
is able to allege that a specific constitutional right such as freedom
of speech, freedom of religion or the right to equal protection has
been violated, then redress is available.5 If the court agrees that
action of the state infringes upon such a right, its attention then
turns to the issue of procedural due process; that is, in the face of
the competing interests involved, did the actions of the state com-
port with what the courts have defined as due process?6 This pro-
cedural due process may include such things as right to notice of
the charges, right to a hearing, and right to confront witnesses.
However, if the individual is unable to allege, or is unsuccessful
in alleging the infringement of a specific constitutional right, the
courts have been singularly reluctant to enter the controversy and
extend relief to the injured party.7 It is submitted that the courts
should extend relief in such a situation because it would protect
important policy interests, policy interests which outweigh those
supporting any interest the state may have in the possession of
unfettered dismissal power. Though it is evident that some courts
have felt this to be the case, there has been a failure to adequately
develop and define a rationale for granting such relief.8
I. EVOLUTION FROM "PRIVILEGE" TO "PROTECTION"
Initially, it is necessary to define the problem and to place it in
the proper historical context. The general problem is determining
what redress is available to a teacher who is either dismissed or
not retained in his teaching position for reasons, or through the use
of procedures, which he feels are arbitrary or capricious. For many
years the courts held the position that a teacher was merely a
4 For example, though a statute may provide certain procedural pro-
tections, if these do not comport with those requirements recognized
under the Due Process Clause, the statutes cannot stand. Also, if
tenure laws require a showing of something as tenuous as "good
cause" for dismissal, and a court does not wish to invalidate the statute
for overbreadth, a court could overturn a palpably arbitrary dismissal
on due process grounds. Cf. section V infra.
5 Cf. Comment, Dismissal of Federal Employees-THE EMERGING JUDI-
cLL ROLE, 66 COL. L. REV. 719 (1966).
6 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7 Comment, supra note 5, at 734.
8 See, e.g., Poddar v. Youngstown State Univ., -F.Supp.- (N.D.Ohio
1971); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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government employee in a typical master-servant relationship and
pursuant to such status his employment was "a privilege to be
commenced, continued and terminated on such terms and condi-
tions as the government may determine, even though these terms
may deny public employees constitutional rights generally enjoyed
by other citizens."9 This was the so-called "privilege doctrine,"
which received its authoritative statement from Mr. Justice Holmes
in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,10 and as recently as 1950
was still operative: 1
It has been held repeatedly and consistently that Government employ
is not "property" and that in this particular it is not a contract. We
are unable to perceive how it could be held to be "liberty". Certainly
it is not "life". So much that is clear would seem to dispose of the
point. In terms the due process clause does not apply to the holding
of a Government office.12
The doctrine saw wide application.13 The reason for this, par-
ticularly in the instance of teachers' rights, might be explained in
terms of judicial reluctance to enter an area not susceptible, or at
least considered by the courts not to be susceptible, to judicial
guidance, coupled with a reluctance on the part of the members
of the teaching profession to actively press claims in the litigation
process. Additionally, there might be the problem of a public atti-
tude unfavorable to judicial vindication of the rights of a persona
non grata.14 The forces behind the development of this theory of
privilege may also be difficult to explain. It may have grown from
9 Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 447, 458 (1963) (footnote omitted).
10 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
" Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), af'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
12 Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted).
13 In Van Astyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HAav. L. Ray. 1439 (1968), there is a discussion
of the rise of the privilege doctrine and the perhaps unwarranted
extension of its effects to the area of private activities. The author
also notes that although the doctrine had in the past been extended
and used to prevent recovery in a variety of situations, nevertheless
"the ... distinction has not in fact removed all restraints from the
government in the public sector.... Increasingly, when the petitioner's
primary interest in the public sector could not be characterized as
a 'right' entitled to protection on grounds of substantive due process,
courts have nonetheless found some other implicated right to sustain
the claim." Id. at 1442.
14 Murphy, supra note 9, at 448-50. The author places no emphasis on
the possibility of judicial reluctance, but it seems likely that this
factor played at least as important a role as those he mentions. Cf.
Comment, supra note 5.
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a 19th century viewpoint of employment in general15 and from a
largely undeveloped theoretical and statutory framework for the
consideration of civil rights problems. 16
In recent years judicial treatment of the issues involved has
expanded for employees of all kinds, and teachers in particular.
In Wiema'n v. Updegraff, 7 the Supreme Court was concerned with
the refusal of Oklahoma state officials to pay the salaries of certain
school teachers who had refused to subscribe to a loyalty oath. The
Court held that the oath was indiscriminate in that it did not dif-
ferentiate between knowing and unknowing membership in sub-
versive organizations. For our purposes, the case is important in
two respects: its refusal to apply the privilege doctrine to public
employment; and its view of society's interest in protecting the
integrity of the teaching profession. The majority opinion noted:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protec-
tion does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to
a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.18
These same themes appeared in Sweezy v. New Hampshire'9
which concerned the contempt conviction of a professor at a state
university for failure to answer questions in a hearing before the
state attorney general. There was no majority opinion, but Chief
Justice Warren's opinion, with Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Black
concurring, contained a statement inconsistent with the privilege
rationale:
The State Supreme Court thus conceded without extended dis-
cussion that petitioner's right to lecture and his right to associate
with others were constitutionally protected freedoms which had been
abridged through this investigation. These conclusions could not be
seriously debated .... These are rights which are safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe that
there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the
15 Witness, for example, the development of the tort doctrine of "fellow
servant."
16 Murphy, supra note 9, at 447 et seq.
17 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18 Id. at 192. This language has further ramifications; see section IV
infra. A concurring opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter fore-
shadowed issues appearing later: "[I]n view of the nature of the
teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment,
inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the
case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly
into operation." Id. at 195.
19 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS
areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in which
government should be extremely reticent to tread.20
These members of the Court seem to have made an assumption
that a teacher in government employ does not relinquish his consti-
tutional rights. This assumption is in no way reconcilable with the
privilege doctrine, although the Court did not indicate its position
in this respect. However, later decisions such as Pickering v. Board
of Education21 show that this is the effect of Sweezy:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in nu-
merous prior decisions of this Court.22
Pickering involved a teacher who had written to a local newspaper
criticizing the school's administrative body for certain of its de-
cisions. Though the decision was ultimately one of First Amendment
rights, another aspect of the opinion is of particular importance. The
Court felt that in order to determine whether the school board was
correct in firing Pickering on the grounds that his letter resulted
in undermining the school's morale, it would be necessary to review
the record and consider the effect of the letter and its contents on
the everyday operation of the school. Thus, in a large measure the
decision turned on two points, the state interests involved and the
procedures used to determine the facts. This illustrates what might
be termed the contemporary judicial manner of dealing with dis-
missal cases. The courts will review the record to determine
whether a substantive right has been abridged, and then will deter-
mine whether the due process standard has been met by balancing
the competing interest involved. This decisional method, as indi-
cated by Pickering, is well established when the basis of the claim
is an alleged violation of a specific constitutional provision, such as
First Amendment freedom of speech.23 Another decisional method,
invoked whenever possible to avoid reaching constitutional ques-
tions, is to use statutory and contractual provisions as a basis for
redress; this approach may be necessary when state action is not
20 Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
21 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Cf. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hear-
ing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193, 234 (1956).
22 391 U.S. at 568. Cf. Birnbaum v. Trussel, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
23 E.g., Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970); Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Franklin v. County School
Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966); Braxton v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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present.24 When an injured party is unable to predicate his claim
on one of these bases there is less willingness on the part of the
courts to extend relief, a situation reminiscent of the reticence noted
earlier during the prevalence of the privilege doctrine.25
II. COMPETING POLICY INTERESTS
Any discussion of the right of a teacher to due process must
begin with the policy interests involved since judicial opinions
often reflect those interests. Then the adjudicative principles used
by the courts to reflect these interests will be discussed, and an
attempt will be made to determine what is an acceptable approach
to the issues.
First, there are essentially three policy interests considered in
protecting a teacher from an arbitrary dismissal or non-retention:
the protection of an individual's interest in a profession, protection
of the social interest in excellence of the profession, and protection
of other constitutional rights which may be violated in a proceed-
ing not subject to judicial scrutiny.
That dismissal or non-retention is traumatic and may have vary-
ing effects on the teacher is obvious. One commentator has char-
acterized the situation in this manner:
24 E.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
25 Comment, supra note 5, at 734. Professor William Van Alstyne, in
The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 70 DuKE L.J.
841, 859-63 (1970), enumerates the barriers to litigation designed to
vindicate the violation of a specific constitutional right: (1) cost; (2)
plaintiff's burden of proof; (3) time required for litigation; (4) to
sue and lose adversely affects a teacher's record; (5) to sue and win
-will expose any proven shortcomings of the teacher and may inhibit
future employment opportunities. The author also summarizes sources
available to a teacher on which to base a claim of a right to pro-
cedural due process: (1) specific constitutional rights cannot be
violated; (2) statutes, administrative orders and the common law;
(3) "[W]hen the proposed action of the government would do more
than terminate the undividual [sic] and would, in addition, inflict an
injury on some aspect of his personal liberty of which he may not
be deprived without due process;" (4) "[A]n independent right to pro-
cedural due process may be found in the accumulating judicial rec-
ognition that one's status in the public sector is itself a form of 'lib-
erty' or 'property' which, while subject to forfeiture as any other
aspect of liberty pursuant to strict procedural safeguards, nevertheless
is an interest not to be divested without adequate procedural safe-
guards to minimize unreasonable risks of error or prejudice." Under
this formulation, the sources listed in the last two categories are
considered here.
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Certainly, the non-retention of a teacher is a matter of most serious
consequence to his career and... is a very serious impediment to a
successful teaching career. Unlike purely political appointees whose
non-retention with changes in policy or administration is a matter of
custom, teachers are normally retained unless they are guilty of
incompetence or some other serious failure of desirability for their
position.26
A teacher has a great stake in his profession, having invested time
and money. Not only does termination of employment cause normal
disruption of life and financial expenditures involved in the search
for a new job and in moving to a new location, but it may also
preclude the attainment of future financial gain, inhibit the teacher's
ability to gain a prestigious position, and perhaps force him to
abandon his profession entirely.
Society also has an interest in maintaining excellence of educa-
tion. This can be done by insuring that teaching remain a profession
where one is "free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate,'"7 unhin-
dered by fear of reprisal for any indication of independence. The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the need
to explore and expound new ideas as an element of academic de-
velopment.2 8
It is also possible that a dismissal may have an effect on specific
constitutional rights when the proceedings are essentially nonre-
viewable. If the state is free to act arbitrarily, it may actually in-
fringe upon one of these rights under the guise of exercising its
unfettered right to control employment. If the process is not subject
to review, the injured party has no right to prove the impermissible
nature of the action:
26 Frakt, supra note 3, at 35. The problem has not escaped the attention
of professional associations. The American Association of University
Professors and the Association of American Colleges have approved
a Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings.
AmVIERIcAN AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FmEnom
,um TENuRE 40 (Joughin ed. 1969).
27 Cf. Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on
Worzella v. Board of Regents, 73 HAv. L. REV. 304 (1959): "The
_ . unique responsibilities of colleges and universities in the United States
are to extend the frontiers of knowledge, to make available to students
the wisdom and knowledge of the past, and to help them to develop
their capacities for critical, independent thought. If these vital tasks
are to be performed with any degree of success, teachers in institu-
tions of higher learning in this country must be as free as possible
from restraints and pressures which inhibit independent thought and
action. They must... be free to puruse truth wherever it may lead."
28 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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Moreover, [the teacher] might find that he had evidence that could
be used to support a claim that he was not rehired for constitution-
ally impermissible reasons. Even if the reasons assigned [for the dis-
missal] were false ones, demonstrating their falsity would have proba-
tive value in a claim that the real reasons lie elsewhere. 29
The state interests involved in the claim for substantially unre-
stricted power to dismiss are efficiency of school administration, the
need for local autonomy and economy, and the untoward effects
of restrictions on hiring practices 0 These interests must be con-
sidered in greater detail.
In considering the advisability of restricting dismissal it is neces-
sary to consider whether this will hinder efficient operation. For
an organization to operate efficiently, and in some cases at all, dis-
cord must be kept at a minimum. The purpose of a school system
is to provide an adequate education for the members of the com-
munity, and this purpose may be jeopardized both from continued
disruption which arises in conflicts over dismissal of individual
teachers and from the retention of substantial numbers of dissident
faculty members within the system. Thus, school administrative
boards should have a large measure of discretion in the area of
employment.
The need for local autonomy is actually based on a particular
philosophical outlook as to the respective responsibilities of dif-
ferent governmental entities. The court in Freeman v. Gould
Special School District3' exhibited this outlook in discussing the
question of a school board's power when it stated: "Local autonomy
must be maintained to allow continued democratic control of edu-
cation as a primary state function, subject only to clearly enunciated
legal and constitutional restrictions. '32
Economy is a standard justification and, indeed, presents a com-
pelling problem. A school's budget should be oriented toward pre-
senting an acceptable education program. The imposed necessity
of expanded procedural requirements in order to meet legal stan-
dards would lead to greater expense and, if adequate funding were
29 Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1970).
Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 858.
30 See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir.
1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
31 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.) (Gibson & Blackmun, J. J.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 843 (1969).
32 Id. at 1157.
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not forthcoming, would result in a reduction of funds available to
meet educational needs.
Finally, a system designed to provide protection of the teaching
profession might actually lead to an adverse result by preventing
the hiring of an innovative teacher when the body with responsi-
bility for hiring knows of the burdensome hearing requirements.33
It could also mean the perpetuation of teachers in positions for
which they are not suited, and thereby a less effective school system,
because a dismissal might be ruled out due to the burdensome
hearing requirements. 3 4
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AVAILABLE FOR
TEACHER PROTECTION
There are three possible rationales available to a court desirous
of protecting the personal and societal interests of the arbitrarily
dismissed teacher. One of the most obvious approaches is asserting
a right to teach. In Meyer v. Nebraska,35 the appellant had been
convicted of teaching the German language in a private school in
contravention of a state statute. The Nebraska Supreme Court held
this was a valid exercise of the police power. The United States
Supreme Court overturned the decision, reasoning that personal
liberties may be restricted by the police power unless the legislative
action is "arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State to effect. '36 The right which the
Court felt was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was "his right ... to teach,"3 on the ground that
this was a liberty within the language of the amendment. It then
held that there was no adequate reason for this interference with a
recognized right. Subsequently, however, the courts have been re-
33 Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
34 There is an additional justification for unfettered dismissal power
when a non-tenured teacher is affected, since any restrictions on such
power would obviate tenure laws. Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F.Supp.
659 (D. Wyo. 1970). This reasoning appears of limited moment for
three reasons: first, it is not absolutely certain that procedural require-
ments for valid dismissals of non-tenured teachers would have to
be the same as those presently imposed by permissible tenure laws
for tenured faculty; second, such reasoning makes the existence of
tenure laws the legal justification for arbitrary dismissals; third, the
mere existence of tenure laws settles no constitutional questions.
35 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36 Id. at 400.
37 Id.
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luctant to raise this particular right and the concept has received
little support in later cases.38
Another approach, somewhat broader than the right to teach,
would be to make public employment a substantive right. This
reasoning would denote such employment as property within the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment; this was the position
taken by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy39 when he indicated that loss of governmental employment
was the loss of a valuable property right. The court in Freeman v.
Gould Special School District" discussed and rejected this conten-
tion. Freeman dealt with school teachers seeking to compel rein-
statement by the school board. One authority used in the petitioner's
argument was Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,41 a case which
arose from the exclusion of an applicant for admission to the New
Mexico bar on grounds of undesirable moral character. The United
States Supreme Court had examined an extensive record and con-
cluded that the finding was not justified. Justice Black stated: "Even
in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude
an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails
to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. '42 The majority in Freeman felt Schware was inap-
posite, on the ground that it dealt with a "right to practice a pro-
fession and did not deal with the narrower question of a right to
specific employment. '43 That is, dismissal of a teacher does not
preclude that same teacher from employment in the same profession
elsewhere, whereas denial of a license to practice law may; this was
the same distinction made by the Supreme Court in Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy. Yet it is possible to raise the opposite assump-
tion that teaching involves the right to practice a profession, and
construct the argument that Schware represents the principle that
governmental employment is property under the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, as in the case of the right to teach, the
Supreme Court has avoided pronouncing this as constitutional doc-
trine, as shown earlier in Wieman.44
38 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (dictum). In Miller
v. Parsons, 313 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. Pa. 1970), the court held that an
allegation that the civil right to teach had been violated stated a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
89 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961).
40 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
41 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
42 Id. at 239.
43 405 F.2d at 1159.
44 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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The one adjudicative principle which has been neither expressly
accepted nor rejected by the Supreme Court is a general due
process right, the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious
action by the state. A decision which takes great pains to deal
expressly with the general due process question is Roth v. Board
of Regents of State Colleges.45 In Roth a non-tenured teacher was
not offered a new contract for the next academic year; the teacher
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging
violations of First and Fifth Amendment rights. The court indicated
that it wished to consider "whether the Fourteenth Amendment
permits non-retention on a basis wholly without factual support,
or wholly unreasoned,' 4 6 where the claim of a petitioner was not
based on an alleged denial of a specific constitutional right. On the
basis of Greene v. McElroy 7 the presence of a general due process
right was held to depend upon which side of the dismissal contro-
versy appeared to have the paramount interests. The state interest
in the continuance of unrestricted dismissal power was considered
to be the danger of preventing an institution from ridding itself of
teachers whose "inadequacies are promptly sensed and grave but
not easily defined."48 However, in light of the strength of the per-
sonal interests of the injured party, the court held that any dismissal
is restricted by the Due Process Clause:
As against this danger, however, there is to be set the interest
of the individual new professor. To expose him to non-retention be-
cause the deciding authority is utterly mistaken about a specific point
of fact, such as whether a particular event occurred, is unjust. To
expose him to non-retention on a basis wholly without reason,
whether subtle or otherwise, is unjust. There can be no question
that, in terms of money and standing and opportunity to contribute
to the educational process, the consequences to him probably will
be serious and prolonged and possibly will be severe and permanent.
"Badge of infamy" is too strong a term, but it is realistic to conclude
that non-retention by one university or college creates concrete and
practical difficulties for a professor in his subsequent academic
career.49
Though the general due process right has never been expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court, it has not escaped attack from
other quarters. There are basically four arguments against the
45 310 F.Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
46 Id. at 976.
47 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
48 310 F.Supp. at 979.
49 Id. The court came to the same conclusion in a companion case dealing
with a secondary school teacher. Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310 F.
Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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right. The first two are merely resurgent forms of the privilege
doctrine within the logical framework of either the general due
process right or the governmental employment right. An example
of the former is the argument that unfettered dismissal must be
given to school boards in view of the state interest in administering
and promoting the educational system. An example of the latter is
the position that the type of employment involved, including that
of the teacher, is merely specific, and is not analogous to decisions
dealing with state licensing in order to carry on a profession, as in
Schware.5 0 Though these criticisms purport to negate the general
due process theory they actually represent, respectively, differences
of opinion as to the relative weight to be given certain consider-
ations in the balancing process, and differences of opinion as to the
placement of the teaching profession in the general-specific employ-
ment scheme.
The remaining two criticisms go more directly to the validity
of the due process doctrine.51 The first raises the question of prece-
dent. Granted, certain procedural safeguards are required pursuant
to statute or contract in regard to a hearing, such as maintaining
a record, notifying the teacher and giving him a chance to defend
himself. In addition, dismissal cannot infringe a specific constitu-
tional right. However, these are the only restrictions on the power;
no Supreme Court decision has gone so far as to insist that all
actions of any governmental body terminating the employment of
a person engaged in a public occupation are subject to the proviso
that they not be arbitrary or capricious. The second criticism of
the doctrine deals with a purported conceptual weakness. Any
postulation of a general due process right acts in a dual capacity;
that is, substantively it is the measure of the right which has been
denied, and procedurally it is the measure of the extent of that
denial. The relative merits of these criticisms rate more extended
discussion in the next section.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS ACTION.
Thus far we have considered the decline of the privilege doctrine,
the establishment of protection for specific constitutional rights of
teachers, and slowly expanding restrictions on the dismissal power
beyond those provided by the protection of specific constitutional
rights. The question remains as to which mode of analysis should
50 Cf. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
51 Cf. 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1079 (1968).
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be and will be accepted. The right to teach has gained little favor,
though it has the virtue of emphasizing the personal interests of the
individual teacher and the societal interests in preserving the aca-
demic process. The right to government employment, on the other
hand, broadens the narrow basis of the right to teach theory, and
perhaps places more emphasis on a balancing of interests, yet it
too has been denied enthusiastic support.52 The general due process
right seems to have two virtues: it has not been expressly or tacitly
rejected by the Supreme Court, and it is stated in terms familiar
to constitutional analysis.
The principles required for application of the general due process
right appear in contemporary case law, and indeed, they may be
seen as almost compelling such a result. In the Wienan case, though
an employment right was rejected as a basis of the Court's conclu-
sion, it was held that "constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory. 53 It is true that the Court spoke in
terms of limitation on the legislature ("pursuant to a statute"),
but there seems little justification for treating the executive power
any differently than the legislative, since similar interests are pres-
ent.54 In the case of state governments, Money v. Holohan55 indi-
cates, as Judge Lay pointed out in his dissent in Freeman,0 that
the Fourteenth Amendment "governs any action of a state, 'whether
thorough its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive
or administrative officers.'-57
Other instances where the language of the Court is not limited
as it was in Wieman can also be found. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his
dissent in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,5 supported not only the
proposition that government employment was "property," but in
addition strongly advocated what has been termed the geneial due
process right:
[I]f [the employee's] badge had been lifted avowedly on grounds
of her race, religion, or political opinions, the Court would concede
that some constitutionally protected interest-whether "liberty" or
52 Yet neither the right to teach nor the right to public employment is
completely moribund. Cf. Miller v. Parsons, 313 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D.
Pa. 1970); McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F.Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1969).
53 344 U.S. at 192.
54 Cf. Comment, supra note 5.
55 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
56 405 F.2d at 1164.
57 294 U.S. at 113 (quoting Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)).
58 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961).
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"property" it is unnecessary to state-had been injured.... [This
Court] holds that the mere assertion by government that exclusion
is for a valid reason forecloses further inquiry...
Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right-not to be
arbitrarily injured by Government-which the Court purports to
recognize. 59
In Birnbaum v. Trussell,60 the petitioner had been discharged from
a New York City hospital. He alleged that the dismissal resulted
from false charges of prejudice toward Negro personnel, and that
the Department of Health prevented his employment in any other
city hospital. His section 1983 action was grounded on a denial of
property without due process. Though the court rejected his due
process argument based on an employment right, it reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the action on grounds similar in content
to those voiced by Mr. Justice Brennan in Cafeteria Workers:
The principal to be extracted . . . is that, whenever there is a
substantial interest, other than employment by the state, involved
in the discharge of a public employee, he can be removed neither
on arbitary grounds nor without procedure calculated to determine
whether legitimate grounds do exist.61
The court raised this right to due process from a consideration of
the crucial personal interests involved measured against the state
interests in an unlimited dismissal power. The personal interests,
it recognized, were "reputation and the ability to pursue a profes-
sion effectively. "62
These assertions in Cafeteria Workers and Birnbaum are strongly
supportive of the general due process argument. If they can be
justified in Supreme Court case law development, then it would
appear that the argument has validity in light of present constitu-
tional principles.
The basic line of reasoning arises from the cases dealing with
the general and specific employment distinction. In regard to gov-
ernment employment the Supreme Court has recognized, in Greene
v. McElroy, 3 the presence of constitutional issues in situations
where the action of a governmental body might result in a stigma
on a person's reputation. This stigma could possibly impair that
person's ability to pursue a chosen field of employment. "[W]here
59 Id. at 900 (1961) (emphasis added).
60 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
61 Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
G2 Id. at 678 n. 13.
63 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reason-
ableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that is untrue. '64 How is
the relative weight of this injury to be measured? A reasonable
conclusion is that the Court will use the same method of balancing
interests that it indicated in Wieman when considering actions
"pursuant to statute," and that the term "governmental action"
will not be construed as limiting only the legislature, since, as one
commentator has phrased it, "the blanket denial of the power to
review executive action seems anomalous against a background
of asserted power to control the action of the legislature.."65
The question remains whether this rationale is of any help to
the teacher if, as Freeman held, a teaching position merely involves
specific employment. The real question is whether the employment
is closer in kind to that in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, where a
waitress was excluded from working on a military base for security
reasons, or Greene v. McElroy, 6 where an executive of a defense
contractor was denied security clearance. As indicated earlier, the
dismissal or non-retention of a teacher may have an extremely
adverse effect on future employment possibilities within the pro-
fession; this may be substantial justification in itself for declaring
teaching analogous to general employment. But it also seems that
if we are to give full import to the Supreme Court statements that
"[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools, '67 and that
"[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust,"6 8 then the question of which interests should prevail must
be answered favorably for the teaching profession. This reasoning
gives weight to an overriding policy concern of insulating the
teaching process from pressures to conform by viewing skeptically
unsubstantiated claims upon which dismissals may be based. It is
64 Id. at 496.
65 Comment, supra note 5, at 737 (footnote omitted). This, of course,
pertains to the situation where dismissal power is viewed as a ques-
tion of administrative discretion.
66 The argument for the existence of a right to be free from arbitrary
and capricious action is even stronger if Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
is limited by the facts of the case, that is, the grounds for the decision
may have been "the traditional and historic power of military com-
manders to exclude civilians from military installations." Murphy,
supra note 9, at 476.
67 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
68 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C. J.).
670 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 4 (1971)
noteworthy in this respect that courts have found compelling pri-
vate interests in occupations which have not received the solicitous
language of the Supreme Court noted above.
6 9
This would seem to answer the objection that the Supreme
Court has never gone so far as to restrict dismissals beyond the pro-
hibitions of specific constitutional rights and statutory or con-
tractual provisions. The reliance that the Court has placed on spe-
cific rights, and the avoidance of constitutional issues where the
case may be satisfactorily disposed of on other grounds, does not
indicate that other constitutional protections do not exist.7 0 Even
more important, the Court has used principles of decision which
are consistent with the due process protection sought. Nor does the
assertion that the general due process right is conceptually weak
present overburdening obstacles to its application. The mere asser-
tion of conceptual weakness does not make it so, nor does judicial
reluctance to utilize the theory necessarily lead to that conclusion.
Support for the general due process right can be seen as merely
construing the term "due process" as a limitation on the arbitrary
exercise of governmental action, and the double duty which the
phrase must serve may be viewed as a necessary concomitant of this
construction.
In summary, under any one of the three theories used, the
crucial questions are the existence and the strength of the state's
interests in an unfettered right to hire and fire, the detrimental
effects of dismissal or non-retention on a teacher in the pursuit of
a career, and the societal interests in preserving the academic
process.7'1 The major legal arguments or principles supporting this
type of protection are similar no matter what term we give the
right of a teacher. The essence of due process is freedom from
arbitrary action on the part of the state. In any given case the
private and societal interest may outweigh the state interest, and
thus, theoretically, the former should prevail. Therefore, it is no
justification to say that an action is taken pursuant to legislative
69 Cf. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F.Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970); Olson
v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 301 F.Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
70 Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1165 (8th Cir.)
(Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
71 Mr. Justice Frankfurter phrased this last interest quite well in his
concurring opinion in Wieman: "Such unwarranted inhibition upon the
free spirit of teachers affects not only those who, like the appellants,
are immediately before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially
to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their
associations by potential teachers." 344 U.S. at 195.
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authorization or executive power if the exercise of such authority
or power is itself limited by the existence of substantive rights of
an individual.
V. INCIPIENT PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION
This analysis of possible due process relief is not meant to sug-
gest that there are not other ways in which the courts may protect
an individual teacher from unreasonable action. Other rationales
exist which could be applied in fact situations similar to those in
which the due process theories appear. These other rationales are
indicated here only to suggest lines of judicial reasoning which may
expand in the future. These include the void for vagueness and
overbreadth principles,72 the Ninth Amendments and the Equal
Protection Clause.74
The reasoning behind application of the void for vagueness and
overbreadth theories has particular relevance to the question of the
validity of tenure laws. Tenure laws are designed to provide
teachers who have completed a specified number of years as pro-
bationary teachers with certain types of procedural rights. The
problem arises from the language of these tenure statutes: "A
tenure teacher may only be discharged for specific statutory mis-
deeds. These are typically quite broadly described in such terms.
as 'incompetency,' 'immorality,' 'continued failure to comply with
regulations' or merely 'good cause.' ,,7 Even if procedural safeguards
are present, if what must be proven is one of these violations, the
protection provided by the tenure laws may be largely illusory.
Although in comparison with statutory schemes which have been
declared vague or overbroad a statute allowing dismissal for the
above reasons is a prime candidate for vociferous objection, it is
probably unrealistic to believe that this theory will become prom-
inent in judicial thinking:
Because of the practical difficulty of structuring a satisfactorily
specific statute for protecting students from exposure to an unfit
teacher, it would seem unlikely that the courts will ever be receptive
to the vagueness aspect of the due process clause as a defense to
dismissal.76
72 Cf. Graham, Freedom of Speech of the Public School Teacher, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 382 (1970).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
74 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
75 Frakt, supra note 3, at 28 (footnote omitted).
76 Graham, supra note 72, at 386.
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The Ninth Amendent is an unused tool in the decisional process.
It would, however, be possible to extend identical protection to an
individual under this amendment as under the Due Process Clause;
for example, the right to be free from arbitrary governmental
action could be posited as a right "retained by the people." It has
been suggested that "[t]here would appear to be no significant
difference between judicially created substantive rights under the
fifth amendment and the open-ended use of the ninth and tenth
amendments to achieve the same results. ' 77 As yet, any considera-
tion of the Ninth Amendment must be largely speculative due to
the paucity of opinions on the subject.
Another avenue which may hold more promise is the Equal
Protection Clause. Its application in the dismissal situation is based
upon the language of Wieman prohibiting "exclusion pursuant to
a statute [which] is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. 78 1 That
is, even if a state may have the power of dismissal over an em-
ployee, it may not exercise this power in a manner that would
result in discrimination by arbitrary action against the employee
dismissed, since this would amount to treating differently a certain
member of the class of public employees. The dismissal would be
allowable only when the state has a valid interest in treating
the particular employee differently, which means that it must be
based upon valid reasons. Professor William Van Alstyne has
verbalized the theory which may be derived from Wieman:
It may well be that no one has a right to secure or to maintain
public employment. In determining whom to admit or whom to con-
tinue in public employment, however, government may not classify
individuals as eligible where the basis of classification is "arbitrary
or discriminatory." A regulation which restricts the continuing
eligibility of employees to the class willing to conform to an un-
reasonable rule of conduct ipso facto establishes an arbitrary classifi-
cation. Such a regulation denies equal protection and is therefore
unconstitutional.79
As far as faculty members are concerned, the result of the appli-
cation of the equal protection argument would be a forced tenure,
as in the due process argument, since there would of necessity have
to be adequate procedural devices for determining whether a dis-
missal were arbitrary. In addition, in determining what is an "un-
reasonable rule of conduct," it would again be necessary to balance
the private and public interests. It appears, then, that application
of the Equal Protection Clause would provide substantive and
77 Comment, supra note 5, at 735 n. 79.
78 344 U.S. at 192.
79 Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1455 (footnote omitted).
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procedural protection similar to the rights to teach, to public em-
ployment, or to general due process.
VI. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-SUMMARY
It must be emphasized that this discussion has been mainly
concerned with the issue of substantive rights. The question does
not stop here, since a substantive right unaccompanied by a pro-
cedural remedy is, in effect, no right at all. Procedural due process
questions will be only briefly discussed because of the relatively
stable nature of these questions in present day case law.80
The extent of procedural requirements in situations involving
the infringement of a substantive right is measured in the same
manner as the general due process right, that is, balancing the
competing interests involved.8 1 The recent decision of Goldberg v.
Kelly8 2 is a pertinent example. There the Court was concerned
with whether a pretermination hearing was mandatory in the case
of contemplated withdrawal of welfare benefits, and, if so, what
form it should take. The right of the welfare recipient to receive
welfare benefits, if she should qualify, was granted. The Court,
noting the often desperate situation of welfare recipients, decided
that a pretermination hearing was necessary because of the im-
portance of the private interest, and delineated the elements of
the required hearing from the one 'fundamental requisite of due
process ... the opportunity to be heard": 88
In the present context these principles require that a recipient have
timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting
any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evi-
dence orally.
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heards 4
Goldberg's analysis is quite clear: the extent and complexity of
the process is tied to the particular fact situation before the Court.
80 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
S1 Of course, the ultimate result will depend upon what interests are
put on the scales. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
82 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
83 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
84 397 U.S. at 267-69 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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As far as the academic environment is concerned, Ferguson v.
Thomas,85 sets an example of the type of requirements which might
apply in the teacher dismissal situation. The court stated that the
following matters would be required where a teacher wished to
oppose termination (taking the common sense approach that in
many cases the instructor would not oppose termination in his
desire to have the charges left unsaid): (a) Notice of the cause or
causes for termination in sufficient detail to fairly enable him to
show any error that may exist; (b) Notice of the names and the
nature of the testimony of witnesses against him; (c) At a reason-
able time after such advice he must be accorded a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in his own defense; (d) A hearing before
a tribunal possessing some academic expertise and an apparent
impartiality toward the charges.8 6
VII. CONCLUSION
The rights of teachers, long ignored by the courts through the
use of the privilege doctrine, are now receiving vindication, espe-
cially through action grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The theory
of privilege now appears to be of little or no importance. However,
this new protection has been limited in some cases by the interpre-
tation of section 1983, which requires allegations of denials of
specific constitutional rights, although when such a right is involved
redress has been extended liberally. The problem arises when a
dismissal or non-retention decision is based upon an unreasoned
and arbitrary decision and the individual is unable to allege a
violation of a specific right. Three theories have been advanced to
extend protection to the individual in this situation. Two of them,
the right to teach and the right to public employment, have gained
only minor judicial support. The general due process right appears
to be the direction in which the courts are now moving. This move-
ments seems likely to expand since the basic elements of the right
are consistent with established adjudicatory principles. This may be
warranted not only by the virtue of consistency, but also by the
desire to promote certain personal and societal policy interests when
the competing interests of the state are subordinate. Finally, there
are alternative modes of analysis, as yet unused. These modes offer
similar protection to the teacher faced with an arbitrary and un-
reasonable dismissal or non-retention decision, and may become
the apposite judicial principles of the future if the due process
rationale should prove unacceptable.
85 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
86 Id. at 856. Cf. Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
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An acknowledgement of the validity of the theories discussed
above would be of little practical significance if courts were to
determine that in any event the state's interests in maintaining
its unfettered power over employment outweigh all other considera-
tions. Of course, it is the author's conclusion that at least insofar
as the teaching profession is concerned this is not the case. How-
ever, it is submitted that one need not concede that recognition
of the existence of a teacher's right to be free from arbitrary and
capricious action would necessarily be deterimental to the state's
interests. As has been indicated, the procedural steps associated
with the review process are neither complex nor inordinately
burdensome. Since educational authorities retain the ability to
terminate the employment of inefficient faculty members without
unacceptable disruption, the major objections to the system of
procedural protection lack compelling force. It should also be em-
phasized that these procedural requirements represent only a neces-
sary minimum. Therefore, an established and acceptable tenure
system could remain unaffected. Perhaps, then, the only real ob-
stacle to the proposals presented in this comment is inertia.
Gary L. Dolan '72
